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Making U.S. Trade Policy Serve Global Food
Security Goals*
by Karen Hansen-Kuhn**

T

Introduction

o the people of poor nations, we pledge to work
alongside you to make your farms flourish and
let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like
ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer
afford indifference to suffering outside our borders; nor
can we consume the world’s resources without regard to
effect. For the world has changed, and we must change
with it.
—President Barack Obama1
More than any U.S. president in history, Barack Obama
has focused public attention on global hunger and the need to
bolster food production by small-scale farmers in developing
countries. He championed this cause at the 2009 G-8 meeting
in L’Aquila, Italy, where he called on world leaders to commit
$20 billion to address food security, promising $3.5 billion from
the United States.2 After a series of consultations among various government agencies and civil society organizations, the
Obama Administration launched the Feed the Future initiative in
April 2010.3 This program emphasizes the importance of smallscale farmers, especially women, in country-led programs and
a multiagency “whole of government” approach to global food
security.4
Conversely, trade talks are gaining new momentum. After
a two-year lull following the collapse of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) talks in 2008, G-20 leaders have called for
a resumption of the negotiations in 2011, with WTO Director
General Pascal Lamy calling for completion of draft modality
texts by the end of March.5 The United States is also promoting
its own ambitious agenda of regional and bilateral trade talks.
Negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership continue to advance
and to expand to even more countries in Southeast Asia.6 The
U.S. and South Korean governments recently resolved remaining differences over market access for automobiles in the United
States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”).7 That agreement,
along with pending bilateral agreements with Panama and
Colombia, could be introduced for Congressional approval in
2011.8
The food, finance, and climate crises are all evidence of how
much the world has changed since the era of free trade accords
began, but the U.S. agricultural trade agenda remains essentially
the same as the approach first adopted in the 1990s under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).9 Recent
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reports of rising food prices and riots in some countries10 add
new urgency to the imperative to get these policies right.
U.S. trade policy must start from our goals rather than our
tactics. Ending global hunger, enhancing incomes and employment, and encouraging a transition to climate friendly agriculture
should be the goals of U.S. agricultural, economic, and development policy. Trade policy should be a tool to support those goals
rather than a loose cannon that shoots them down.

From Dumping to Volatility: The Lessons
of Trade Liberalization
Much of the international debate on trade and agriculture
over the past decade has focused on U.S. (and EU) agricultural
subsidies11 but have not addressed the systemic causes of dumping, i.e., exporting at below the cost of production. Floods of
cheap imports, especially during the harvest, can be devastating for developing-country farmers.12 As of 2003, dumping
margins for U.S. commodity crops supported under the Farm
Bill included wheat exports at an average price of twenty-eight
percent below the cost of production, corn at ten percent, and
rice at twenty-six percent below the cost of production.13 Today,
recurring bouts of rising food prices have decreased the extent of
dumping,14 but deregulated trade continues to present challenges
for stable local food markets.
Over the last few decades, U.S. agricultural policy has
changed from a system of supply management to one more
dependent on free-market forces. This process culminated in the
1996 Farm Bill, which removed the last vestiges of supply management and enacted policies to encourage farmers to increase
the volume of production to compensate for lower prices, with
a strong focus on creating new markets overseas for U.S. commodities.15 That system soon resulted in a series of crises in rural
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areas and the enactment of emergency payments, later codified
as the current system of agricultural subsidies.16
Commodity prices skyrocketed during 2007 and 2008,
and farmers were better able to cover their costs of production,
reducing counter-cyclical payments from the U.S. government
to farmers, which rise to compensate farmers when prices are
low for those crops.17 As a result of this increase in commodity prices, U.S. agricultural subsidies dropped from more than
twenty-four billion dollars in 2005 to just over twelve billion
dollars in 2009.18 In many countries, locally grown food suddenly became cheaper than imports, but after decades of neglect
of agricultural sectors, production levels were too low to be
able to fully meet domestic demand.19 Concerns over dumping have been overtaken by alarm over food-price volatility, as
wild swings in prices make planning more and more difficult for
farmers around the world.
The precise causes of the 2008 food price crisis and
the recent bouts of price swings are still the subject of much
debate.20 They include rising demand, extreme weather conditions, and excessive financial institution speculation on commodity markets.21 New limits on commodity speculation in the
United States and EU are imperative to decrease the wild price
swings experienced in recent years.22 However, policymakers in
developing countries also need new ways to manage trade flows,
so they can rebuild fragile agricultural sectors.
Mexico’s experience under NAFTA provides a telling example of the dangers of this approach for food security and rural
livelihoods. The agreement eliminated trade barriers for most
sectors, with tariffs on corn and beans phased out over fourteen
years.23 In fact, the Mexican government accelerated the tariff
reduction schedule, and United States exports of corn to Mexico
nearly quadrupled compared to the pre-NAFTA levels.24 Mexican agricultural exports to the United States also increased at an
average of ten percent a year,25 but the benefits of those sales
did not trickle down to rural communities. Many Mexican farmers were unable to compete with the cheap imports, and more
than two million have left the agricultural sector since NAFTA
began, a drop of nearly twenty-five percent.26 Since job creation
in other sectors of the economy has been weak, rural poverty has
increased and many people have been forced to migrate to cities
in search of elusive manufacturing sector jobs or to the United
States in search of better opportunities.27
There is little evidence that the growth in U.S. exports under
NAFTA has helped family farmers in this country either. The
number of Americans employed in agriculture has dropped since
the agreement began (as has manufacturing employment).28
The relationship between employment and trade is complex,
even in the United States, as job creation from export growth
can be offset by job losses resulting from imports that compete
with domestic production. The kind of production also matters
as large-scale agro-industrial production for export generally
employs fewer people than smaller-scale, locally oriented production. As smaller-scale producers have been forced to seek offfarm income, larger producers and corporations have increased
their share of production. Over the last twenty-five years, there
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has been a marked shift in the size of U.S. farms, with very small
farms (with annual sales less than ten thousand dollars) and very
large farms (sales exceeding one million dollars) increasing
by thirty-eight and 243 percent, respectively.29 The number of
small, but commercially viable farms (sales between ten and two
hundred and fifty thousand dollars) dropped by forty percent,
from half of total farms in 1982 to less than a third in 2007.30
The percentage of U.S. agricultural production controlled by the
top four firms in a given sector has increased substantially, rising
from seventy-two percent of beef packing in 1990, for example,
to 83.5 percent in 2005.31
Since NAFTA, U.S. agricultural production, both for
domestic use and exports, has increased while rural employment
and livelihoods have faltered. While a substantial portion of corn
production is now directed to domestic ethanol production,32
exports of corn, wheat, and other commodity crops have continued to grow.33 According to the United States Department of
Agriculture (“USDA”) estimates, agricultural bulk export volumes increased eight percent in 2010 over 2009 levels, while the
bulk export values increased seventeen percent.34
The recent surge in U.S. farm income is instructive. Net
farm income increased twenty-six percent in 2010 over the
2000–2009 average, triggered, according to some analysts, by
rising exports.35 However, the USDA also notes that,
[a] second feature of the 2000–2009 decade is the high
and persistent levels of volatility in agricultural commodity and input (feed, fuel, and fertilizer) markets.
The volatility is reflected in the patterns of farm income
during the decade. Net farm income increased in 6 of
the 10 years, posting an average increase of 26.6 percent in the years with increases in farm income and
an average decline of 23.5 percent in the other years
(2002, 2005, 2006, and 2009).36
These wild swings in prices and incomes destabilize rural
communities and contribute to increasing corporate concentration. Whether in the United States or overseas, agricultural policies that stabilize prices at levels nearer the cost of production
could provide consistent signals and incentives to help farmers
stay on their land and produce stable food supplies.37
These problems are not unique to the NAFTA partners.
In country after country, trade liberalization in agriculture has
weakened local production and undermined rural livelihoods.38
Women produce sixty to eighty percent of food in many developing countries.39 They are particularly vulnerable to the risks
created by dumping and volatile markets, since their access to
productive resources is often already precarious. The emphasis
on agricultural exports in the 1990s tended to result in a shift
away from food production for household consumption, which
tended to be controlled by women, to cash crops, which tended
to be controlled by men.40 The U.S. Feed the Future initiative
recognizes the vital importance of women’s contributions to
food security and would direct more resources to women farmers.41 If the point of the U.S. global hunger policy is to improve
food security and rural livelihoods for women and men, then
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appropriate trade mechanisms also need to be in place to ensure
that they can stay on their land.
Haiti is another stark example of how trade policies can
undermine food security. As recently as the 1980s, Haiti produced eighty percent of the rice it needed for domestic consumption.42 Under structural adjustment programs imposed by the
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and United
States Agency for International Development (“USAID”),
among others, Haiti lifted import controls and reduced public
support to agriculture.43 Today, it imports eighty percent of its
rice needs and receives substantial food aid for recurring food
shortages.44
In March 2010, former President Bill Clinton testified to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the push to export rice
to Haiti had been a grave mistake, stating:
Since 1981, the United States has followed a policy,
until the last year or so when we started rethinking it,
that we rich countries that produce a lot of food should
sell it to poor countries and relieve them of the burden of producing their own food, so, thank goodness,
they can leap directly into the industrial era. It has not
worked. It may have been good for some of my farmers
in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake. It
was a mistake that I was a party to. I am not pointing
the finger at anybody. I did that. I have to live every day
with the consequences of the lost capacity to produce a
rice crop in Haiti to feed those people, because of what
I did. Nobody else.45
Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that the U.S. government
has in fact started to rethink this policy. The President’s 2010
Trade Policy Agenda clearly stated the intention to expand U.S.
exports, even to developing countries.46 While Least Developed
Countries (“LDCs”) are not being asked to agree to any new
commitments to reduce tariffs under the Doha Round, there is
no indication that United States Trade Representative (“USTR”)
is reconsidering the wisdom of the previous rounds of tariff
reductions.
A better approach would be to explicitly exempt low-income
food import-dependent countries from U.S. export promotion
goals and to allow flexibility to establish tariff rates adequate
to protect their vulnerable agricultural markets. The LDCs, as
defined by the United Nations, include some forty-eight leastdeveloped countries, thirty-one of which are also members of
the WTO.47 It includes such countries as Haiti, Senegal, and
Bangladesh, many of which experienced food riots during the
2008 price spike.48 The United States does not have free-trade
trade agreements with any of these countries, so this would be a
relatively simple first step.
A second step would be to more carefully consider poverty
and hunger within middle-income countries. USTR has entered
into a series of discussions with India, Brazil, South Africa, and
China, both to enlist their support to restart the WTO talks, and
to press them to liberalize their own markets.49 Each of these
countries is unique, but they all face challenges in local food
production. According to research prepared for the United
11

Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”) Human Development Report, there are more poor people in India than in the
twenty-six African countries combined,50 and suicides by farmers who have lost their land are devastating evidence of the fragility of their agricultural system.51
Developing countries in the G-33 have argued for WTO
exemptions for Special Products and for the establishment of a
new Special Safeguard Mechanism to protect food security and
livelihoods and to advance rural development.52 While WTO
members (including the United States) committed to the principle of protecting local markets to advance food security at the
2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, in practice this has been a central
point of contention in the WTO talks.53 The G-33’s insistence
on these mechanisms (as well as United States intransigence on
subsidies) was one of the key factors in the collapse of the WTO
talks in 2008.54 A better approach would be to work with developing countries to consider the best ways to implement these
mechanisms and other necessary measures to advance food
security goals over export promotion.

The Trade Rules Needed to Respond to
Climate and Food Crises
Agriculture has always been subject to unpredictable
weather patterns, pests, and diseases. These risks are exacerbated by climate change, which is already causing changes in
growing seasons and increases in droughts and flooding.55 These
effects will become more frequent and more devastating in years
to come,56 making it even more important to support flexible and
innovative new approaches in developing countries. Efforts to
strengthen local agricultural production in ways that respond to
these challenges and benefit local communities and plans to foster regional cooperation in times of crisis are critical.
National and regional coordination of food reserves is
emerging as an important tool to confront volatility in food supplies. The UN Comprehensive Framework for Action on the
Global Food Crisis (a multiagency effort to coordinate donor
policies) recognizes the importance of reserves.57 Reserves and
other measures to limit price volatility and supply availability
will be at the center of the agenda at the May 2011 G-20 Agriculture Ministers summit and the fall Committee on World Food
Security meeting.58
Several groupings of countries are already taking action to
implement regional reserves systems. “In March 2010, Brazil,
Russia, India and China (the BRIC nations) agreed to support the
establishment of a system of national grain reserves.”59 In October, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) plus
Japan, China, and Korea committed to establish a regional emergency rice reserve, building on a pilot program that has been
operating for several years.60 In December, West African nations
meeting in the Club du Sahel explored proposals to coordinate
national food reserves systems to assist each other in cases of
crop failures or other crises.61
A system of food reserves does not replace international
trade, but it can be an important means to stabilize national
and regional food supplies. Food reserves can be supported or
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

constrained by trade rules that govern public support to agriculture. WTO rules and U.S. trade policy discourage public management of food supplies, but there is some degree of flexibility
that would not prevent countries from starting to implement
such programs.62 Food reserves do require public support to buy
and sell stocks. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture limits how
much governments can spend to support agriculture.63 While the
establishment of a grain reserve in the United States could raise
overall support beyond those limits, developing countries would
be unlikely to exceed the limits included under current rules.
Price bands could be a bigger issue for U.S. trade policy.
Most reserves systems operate so that when prices reach predetermined floors or ceilings the government intervenes.64 If it
has buffer stocks, it could release those reserves onto the market
to reduce high prices or confront local food shortages. It would
purchase grains when prices are low, particularly during the harvest. These price bands are often coordinated with trade policy,
with tariffs on imports triggered when prices fall, and reduced
when they rise. While WTO rules generally limit such measures,
in practice, many developing countries have some degree of flexibility in the application of tariff rates.65 Since many of them
have agreed to bound tariff rates (ceilings) that are higher than
the actual applied rates, they could utilize the difference in tariff
rates (“water” in WTO lingo) to operate a price band and still
comply with WTO rules.66 The G-33’s proposals for a Special
Safeguard Mechanism would institutionalize price bands as a
legitimate tool to combat volatility.67 USTR has argued against
these measures at the WTO, pressing for reductions in bound
tariff rates and opposing the G-33’s proposal for a Special Safeguard Mechanism.68 In negotiations for a US-Andean Free Trade
Agreement, the United States insisted on the dismantling of
the system of price bands established under the Andean Pact.69
Those negotiations were later narrowed to a bilateral agreement
between the United States and Peru, which liberalized all trade
in agricultural goods and eliminated the Peruvian government’s
participation in the regional price band.70
The conflicts between trade rules and food reserves could
emerge in the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership
(“TPP”). The TPP talks currently include Australia, Brunei,
Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United
States, and Vietnam.71 The Philippines, Canada, and Japan have
also expressed interest in joining the talks.72 Brunei, Malaysia,
Vietnam and the Philippines are also members of ASEAN and
are participating in the Emergency Rice Reserve System, as is
South Korea.73 Those talks should balance interests in expanding trade with the measures needed to support food reserves and
other elements of food security.

Integrating Nutrition in Trade and
Development
Improving food security means increasing both the quantity
of food available to local consumers and ensuring that its nutritional quality is adequate. The administration’s Feed the Future
initiative lists two central objectives: accelerating inclusive agriculture sector growth, and improving nutritional status.74 U.S.
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trade policy focuses on harmonizing food safety standards (both
to generate new market opportunities and to ensure consumer
safety),75 but it does not consider the nutritional value of the
kinds of food systems encouraged by liberalization of trade and
investment.
The debate on nutritional quality is already underway within
the United States, where concerns about rising obesity rates and
food safety have increased demand for organic foods and locally
grown fruits and vegetables.76 There is a growing public recognition that Farm Bill supports for corn, soy, wheat, and rice
have shifted diets towards processed foods and meats rather than
healthier alternatives.77 U.S. trade policy should also reflect this
new thinking in the kinds of food production encouraged by liberalized trade and the innovations needed to improve nutritional
outcomes.
Mexico’s experience under NAFTA provides some important lessons. Since the agreement’s inception in 1994, Mexican imports of corn and soy used for animal feed, as well as
of processed snack foods, soda and other foods characteristic
of unhealthy diets, have skyrocketed.78 Liberalization of trade
and investment rules has also spurred sharp increases in U.S.
investment all along the Mexican supply chain, including food
processing, supermarkets and fast food restaurants.79 Obesity
rates in Mexico have risen to rates similar to those in the United
States.80 Among OECD countries, Mexico is now tied with
the United States for the highest per capita obesity rates in the
world.81 The phenomenon of increasing malnutrition occurring
at the same time as over-nutrition is escalating in many countries
around the world as people just above the poverty line consume
increasing amounts of meats, processed foods and other relatively low-cost, high-calorie foods.82
The United States cannot legislate consumer demand in
other countries, but it could assure that its trade policy does not
preclude governments from implementing changes in local food
systems to improve the quality of food available to consumers. A
government might decide, for example, to procure fresh food for
anti-poverty programs from local farm cooperatives rather than
importing it from a multinational corporation (along the lines of
Brazil’s successful Zero Hunger program).83 Depending on how
the government has listed the implementing agencies in its trade
commitments, these kinds of programs could conflict with procurement rules that aim to prevent discrimination against foreign
suppliers.84
Some types of food security programs could also be the
target of investor lawsuits. Like nearly all U.S. trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties, NAFTA allows foreign
investors to sue governments for compensation for regulatory
changes or programs that undermine their expected profits.85
One section of the investment chapter bans certain “performance
requirements” on foreign investors, including the requirement to
achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content in production.86 Thus, for example, if the Mexican government were to
require tortilla manufacturers in Mexico to use a certain percentage of locally grown (and more expensive) corn in their produc-
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tion, U.S. companies that own tortilla operations there could sue
for compensation.
Most trade agreements include recourse to state-to-state dispute resolution.87 The investor-state provision allows companies
to bypass that mechanism, as well as local court systems, to sue
governments directly.88 Most environmental, labor, and other
public-interest groups have argued against this provision in most
bilateral trade agreement the United States has negotiated since
NAFTA.89
These concerns are not just theoretical. The U.S.-based Metalclad corporation was awarded $15.6 million in compensation
when it sued the Mexican government over a local community’s
refusal to reopen a toxic waste facility.90 A subsidiary of the
U.S.-based Bechtel corporation sued the Bolivian government
when it cancelled the privatization of a water distribution system
in the wake of widespread public protests over excessive user
fees.91 In 2010, Phillip Morris filed an investor-state suit against
the Uruguayan government over rules on health warnings on cigarette packages.92 Even when such suits are unsuccessful, they
have a chilling effect on local efforts to balance public interests
with private profits.
Some trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties
include tentative first steps that could start to address that imbalance. The United States-Peru FTA, for example, establishes
some general exceptions for measures designed to protect public health, safety and the environment, but these exceptions do
not apply to the chapter on investment.93 This kind of exception
should be applied more broadly to specifically exempt public
interest laws from challenges.94
Unfortunately, current U.S. trade policy seems to be headed
in the opposite direction, affirming the Bush era approach. News
reports indicate that the United States is pressing Australia,
which refused to include the investor-state provision in its FTA
with the United States, to reconsider that position in the talks
for a Trans-Pacific Partnership.95 The recently signed US-Korea
FTA resorts to the old approach as well, with only limited excep
tions to protect the public good.96

Recommendations
Ultimately, the U.S. government should take a comprehensive set of acts that will alleviate these problems. It should
review provisions in existing trade agreements that undermine
food security and launch a process to reform them.97 The administration should explicitly exempt Least Developed Countries
from U.S. export-promotion goals, and work with developing
countries to establish trade rules that support price bands and
other mechanisms to promote stable food supplies. On an intergovernmental level, it should support proposals at the WTO and
in the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership for Special
Products and Special Safeguard Mechanisms to advance food
security and rural livelihoods in developing countries. Lastly, the
United States could establish exceptions to investment and procurement provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership and other
ongoing bilateral trade negotiations to protect public health and
food security.
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Conclusion
Rather than continuing with the same tired approaches
used in recent decades, it is time for a truly twenty-first century
approach to trade policy, one that starts with a clear commitment
to strengthening food systems and rural livelihoods in the South
and North. It is not enough to consider changes in trade balances
or growth in exports in particular sectors. We must examine how
those changes affect our societies and environments, both in the
North and South.
The 2008 food price crisis led to a reexamination of agricultural development policies and the conclusion that decades of
neglect of public investment in the sector had been a mistake.98
President Obama took a leadership role in the 2009 G-8 meeting,
committing to scale up food security spending and calling on
other countries to do the same.99 The Feed the Future initiative
and increases in U.S. government spending on food security are
evidence of a commitment to redress that mistake and chart a
new course to decrease global hunger.
Sadly, that effort will likely collide with the administration’s
push to double U.S. exports and negotiate new trade agreements
along the same lines as the past. Spending to increase production by smallholder farmers will be undercut by floods of U.S.
exports. Efforts to establish food reserves could be undercut by
trade rules that restrict governments’ abilities to manage supplies.100 Programs to encourage consumption of healthy, locally
grown foods could collide with investor protections that fail to
balance public and private interests.101 Decades of expansion of
agricultural exports have not helped U.S. farmers either. Farm
incomes have been on a rollercoaster ride that has thrown farmers overboard, increasing corporate concentration.102 There is no
reason to expect that expanding the same failed policies of the
past will have better outcomes now.
Instead, trade and food security policy should focus on
rebuilding local food systems in the North and South. This does
not mean abandoning trade or closing markets, but considering
ways to ensure that trade complements, rather than substitutes
for, local food production. The U.S. government should work
with developing countries to determine the best ways to structure price bands and other trade protections to achieve food
security and development goals, rather than blocking progress
on these new approaches.
Added to the evidence of the past is the challenge of the
future. Climate change and the end of cheap oil is a dispositive
factor in determining food security and trade policy.103 Innovative new approaches that build on local knowledge to reduce
reliance on agrochemicals and imported inputs are not just exciting, they are imperative.104 Trade and development policies must
create the necessary policy space for these innovations rather
than insisting on the extension of twentieth century models of
industrial agriculture and dependence on imports.

Endnotes: Making U.S. Trade Policy Serve Global Food
Security Goals on page 36
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